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Case No. 11722 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, William Coleman, appeals 
from his conviction of the crime of assault with a 
deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm in vio -
lation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-7-6 (1953), 
by a jury in the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Edward Sheya presiding. The appellant was sen -
tenced to the indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years imprisonment at the Utah State Prison. 
-
OlSPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged in an informa-
rion on December 6, 1968 charging the appel -
lant with assault with intent to commit murder 
.:illcging that he assaulted Linda Martin, with in -
tent to murder. The appellant was arraigned on 
December 9, 1968 and entered a plea of not guilty 
to the information on December 16, 1968. The 
jury trial in the instant case commenced on April 
15, 1969 in Ogden, Utah, and concluded on April 
18, 1969. The jury found the appellant guilty of 
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do 
bodily harm, a lesser included offense in the ini -
tial charge. Judge Edward Sheya entered a judg-
ment upon this verdict and on the 8th day of May, 
1969, sentenced the appellant to a term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that the conviction 
be reversed, and a new trial granted. 
-2-
STATEMENT or PACTS 
For the purposes of this brief the trans -
,· 1-ipl (Jf the testimony will be referred to as "T". 
Tl 1l? rccorJ of the proceedings, as certified by 
t!h.' Wcb\..T County Clerk, will be referred to as 
"j\ ". Ir W<.lS stipulated by counsel that on the 19th 
Jay of September, 1968, the appellant fired two 
::ihots from a . 22 caliber pistol at the prosecut-
ing witness, Linda Martin; the bullets entered 
body. The complaining witness, Linda Mar-
tin, and the appellant had been seeing each other 
socially for some time and Miss Martin desired 
to ui.sc0i1tinue this relationship. The shooting 
took place on the steps of the Pingree School in 
Ogden, Utah. The appellant testified that he had 
bl?cn Jr inking during the day and that he had re-
moved a . 22 caliber automatic pistol from his 
automobile which had been abandoned on the 
highway (T. 193, and T. 200). The appellant 
-3-
further re stified that during a struggle, which 
wok p1acc on the steps of the Pingree School, 
the gun in his possession accidentally discharged 
inflicting the injuries on Miss Martin. Appellant 
swtcd he had no intention of killing anyone (T. 
298), that he was in love with the complain-
ing witness on the night of the shooting, (T. 300). 
In connection with the defense presented 
by the appellant, Trooper Newell G. Knight, 
testified on behalf of the appellant. Trooper 
Knight, a trooper connected with the training 
division of the Utah State Highway Patrol, testi-
fied to his qualifications as an expert in the field 
of alcohol and its effect on the human body and 
mind. Trooper Knight stated that he was able to 
compute what he believed to be the appellant's 
level of blood alcohol as a result of the stated 
quantities of beverages consumed by the appell -
ant. Trooper Knight stated in his opinion that 
-4-
<1ppc11ant, at the time and date in question, 
wuu kl l1a vc a blood alcohol level, "Probably in 
l hL' <l J°l'a of between point one five and point 
oi1L' eight per cent. " (T. 240) Trooper Knight 
further testified that in his opinion with that 
kvcl of alcohol, appellant would be impaired. 
rr. 242) He stated further that with the use 
of certain tests the appellant's mental and motor 
abilities "would be measurably impaired to the 
point that we could measure the impairity." 
The following dialogue took place between appel-
lam's counsel and Trooper Knight: 
"Q. Now talking about this same 
man again, his physical impaired-
ne ss. flow would that affect his 
ability to handle a gun? 
A. Well, the physical impairment 
to be physically impaired means 
a number of things. One, your re -
actions are different, you can 
either be slowed down or speeded 
up. rn1c person would be more 
unsafe with a gun as a person would 
be more unsafe to drive. How much 
he would be impaired it is hard to 
-5-
say. When a per son is impaired 
the, the fine motor reflexes that 
we have become impaired. To 
have a n1an write a sentence, for 
example, at very low levels of 
alcohol he may become very, 
scrawling in his writing. So I 
think that to measure this impair-
n1ent the fine muscle sense and the 
muscle tone is, he is very definite-
ly impaired and I think a man would 
be impaired to handle any type of 
gun, whether it is a car or gun or 
whatever it is." (T. 244) 
The counsel for the appellant at trial 
also called Mr. Roscoe E. Grover to the stand 
on behalf of the appellant to testify as a gunsmith. 
Mr. Grover stated that he had been a gunsmith, 
as a sideline, for approximately 29 years and 
testified that it is possible that a semi -automatic 
weapon, similar to the one in question, can, 
through wear, maladjustment, or alteration, 
malfunction in a manner causing it to continue 
to fire if the trigger is pulled just once. Mr. 
Grover further testified, in his opinion, as a 
gunsmith, that notwithstanding the safety devices 
-:6-
---
on most s1nall semi -automatic pistols it is possi -
b]c that the firearm can be discharged uninten -
tionally under certain conditions of malfunction. 
(T. 256, 257) 
At the conclusion of the state's rebuttal 
case, the court instructed the jury, in Instruction 
No. 7 (R. 17), as follows: 
"Our law provides that "no act 
committed by a person while 
in a state of voluntary intoxica -
tion is less criminal by reason 
of his having been in such condi-
tion." This means that such a 
condition, if shown by the evidence 
to have existed in the defendant 
at the time when allegedly he com -
mitted the crime charged, is not 
of itself a defense. It may throw 
light on the occurence and aid you 
in determining what took place; 
but when a person in a state of in -
toxication, voluntarily produced 
in himself, commits a crime, the 
law does not permit him to use 
his own vice as a shelter against 
the normal, legal consequences 
of his conduct. 
However, when the existence of 
any particular motive, purpose or 
intent is a necessary element to 
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constitute a particular kind or 
degree of crime, the jury, in 
determining whether or not such 
motive, purpose or intent existed 
in the mind of the accused, must 
take into consideration the evidence 
offered to prove that the accused 
was intoxicated at the time when 
the crime allegedly was committed. 
This fact requires an inquiry into 
the state of mind under which the 
defendant committed the act charged, 
if he did con1mit it. In pursuing that 
inquiry, it is proper to consider · 
whether he was intoxicated at the 
time of the alleged offense. The 
weight to be given the evidence on 
that question and the significance 
to attach to it, in relation to all 
the other evidence, are exclusively 
within your province. " 
The court had previously instructed the 
jury in Instruction No. 5 (R. 17) that: 
"You are instructed ti1at you are 
not to be governed by the opinion 
of any of the witnesses nor by the 
opinion of the defendant nor the com -
plaining witness, whether written 
or oral, as to what happened on the 
evening of September 19, 1968, but 
that you are to determine the happen -
ings or occurences of that evening 
solely by all of the facts and circum -
stances which have been introduced 
in evidence before you. " 
-S-
Defense counsel objected to the giving 
of Instruction No. 5 in the following exchange: .. 
"MR. RENCHER: What number 
jury instruction was it on opinion? J 
MR. SHARP: Five I believe. .. 
THE COURT: I think that if you 
understood that instruction you 
would have no objection to it. I 
tell them to base their verdict upon 
all of the circumstances and facts 
in the case, you see. I simply say 
that they are not to be governed by 
the opinion of any witness, but that 
they should base their verdict upon 
all the facts and circumstances of 
the case. I don't believe that you 
will find that is in error if you read 
it carefully. 
MR. RENCHER: Your Honor, I 
respect the situation of the court 
and ask permission to enter an 
exception in the record concerning 
Instruction No. 5. 
THE COURT: You may have your 
exception. 
MR. RENCHER: Thank you, Your 
Honor. Defendant excepts to Instruc-
tion No. 5 for the reason that opinion 
evidence was ruled admissible and 
entered into evidence in this case 
and therefore, should be considered 
-9-
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by the jury. Thank you, Your 
Honor. " (T. 327, 328) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCT-
ING TI-IE JURY TO DISREGARD THE OPIN-
ION 0 F ANY OF THE WITNESSES, THE 
OPINION OF THE DEFENDANT, OR THE 
OPINIONS OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS, 
WRITTEN OR ORAL AS THIS DEPRIVED 
THE APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE 
THE JURY FULLY AND FAIRLY CONSIDER 
EVERY FACTUAL MATTER SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RAISED IN 
HIS DEFENSE, AND CONSTITUTED A COM-
MENT ON THE EVIDENCE. 
Without question the origin of jury In-
struction No. 5 (R. 17) may be found in the dis-
cussion between court and counsel dealing with 
a letter sent by the complaining witness, Linda 
Martin to the appellant subsequent to the shoot-
ing and prior to trial. This letter appears 
in the record at Page 19 as defendant's Exhibit 
1 (the envelope) and defendant's Exhibit 2 (the 
letter). The letter, in effect, states that the 
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complaining witness was confused as to the 
events of the night in question, and that she 
felt the shooting was an accident. 
The court out of the hearing of the jury 
made the following statement shortly prior to 
the admission of the letter iri question: 
"Talking from his (the district 
attorney's) standpoint whether 
the objection should be made to 
the letter or whether it shouldn't 
be allowed in as long as they Uurors) 
already know practically what it 
contains and have heard the conver-
sation which contains the same type 
that is in the letter, but I am going 
to instruct on that. I am going 
to make proper instruction, what I 
think are proper instructions, at 
any rate. If the letter is admitted, 
and I think in view of the telephone 
conversation there should be in -
structions made also. As to the 
weight to be given to any opinion 
that she may have expressed." 
It was the courts concen1 over the com-
plaining witnesses opinion as to whether or not 
the shooting was accidental, that led the trial 
judge into formulating jury Instruction No. 5, 
-11-
... 
wllich goes substantially beyond anything con -
remplated at the time of the admission of defen -
dants Exhibits 1 and 2. 
Instruction No. 5 does not deal solely 
with the problem of the complaining witness's 
suhseque11t opinion of the events on the night 
of September 19, 1968 but extends to opinions 
of any witnesses, opinions of the defendant and 
of the complaining witness, whether written 
or oral, as to what happened during the evening 
of September 19, 1968. The appellant urges 
that such a broad -brushed treatment of opinion 
evidence, particularly in view of testimony 
offered for the defense, effectively eviscerates 
the defense position and denies to the appellant 
the benefit of the testimony of Trooper Knight 
and Roscoe E. Grover. These gentlemen were 
both testifying from opinion. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that either of these 
' 
defense witnesses had any personal connection 
-12-
---
whatsoever with the principals involved in the 
shooting or any personal proximity to or con - · 
nection with the events of the evening of Sept-
ember 19, 1968. 
Unquestionably, with the proper quali -
fication and after proper foundation has been 
laid at trial, the appellant is entitled to pre -
sent opinion evidence, as it bears on the level 
of his intoxication and opinion evidence bearing 
upon the mechanical malfunctions of hand guns. 
It is interesting to note that although the jury 
is instructed in Instruction No. S not to be 
governed by the opinion of Trooper Knight, 
an individual with extensive experience in deal-
ing with the physiological effects of alcohol, 
they are instructed in Instruction No. 7 to take 
into consideration evidence offered to prove 
that the accused was intoxicated at the time 




This paradox created by the unjustified 
language of Instruction No. 5, viewed in light 
the defendant's right to present defenses to 
these charges leads to one conclusion, the 
trial court committed reversible error. 
The effect of such an instruction is to 
withhold from the consideration of the jury 
evidence on behalf of the defendant and to 
effectively comment upon the evidence as pro-
hibited by the laws of the State of Utah. The 
court in giving instructions n1ust not resolve 
conflicts in evidence for the jurors or indicate 
what particular testimony a trial court may 
believe correctly states the facts. Weber vs. 
Snow, 102 Ut. 435, 132 P. 2d 114 (1942); State 
vs. Hanna, 81 Ut. 583, 21P.2d 537 (1933); 
Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, 41 Ut. 121, 124 
Pac. 522 (1912); Morgan vs. Bingham Stage Lines 
, 7 5 Ut. 87, 283 Pac. 160 ( 1929). Further, 
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to instruct on or explain the evidentiary value 
of some facts to the exclusion of others, un -
less such facts require explanation, would 
tend to emphasize particular evidence. This 
has been held to constitute a comment on the 
evidence by the court. Mecham vs. Allan, 
1Ut.2d 79, 262 P. 2d, 285 (1953). As stated· 
in State vs. Crank, 105 Ut. 332, 142 P. 2d 178 
( 1943): 
"In this state it is exclusively 
the province of the jury to pass 
upon the evidence, and the court 
may not make any comment 
thereon. State vs. Green, 78 
Ut. 580, 6 P. 2d 177. 
Likewise, the court should not give 
instructions which tend to eliminate an issue 
properly before the jury on which evidence has 
been received. Alabama Lumber vs. Keel, 
125 Ala. 603, 28 So. 204 (1900). The California 
Supreme Court in People vs. Schader stated 
that the failure to instruct a jury on the basis 
-15-
\)f JLfcndants evidence constitutes prejudicial 
error. 62 C. 2d, 716, 401 P. 2d 665 (1965 ). 
Other California cases with similar 
holdings are People vs. Jeter, 60 C. 2d 671, 
388 P. 2d 355 (1964); People vs. Carmen, 36 
C.2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951). 
It should be noted that the jury instruct-
ions are intended to enlighten the jury and call 
attention to specific issues which must be 
determined by them and, contrary to Instruc-
tion No. 5 given in the case at Bar, instructions 
should contain only statements of law to be 
applied in this determination. State vs. Selgado, 
76 N. M. 187, 413 P. 2d 469 (1966). This 
Court has stated that the defendant is entitled 
to have the jury instructed on his theory of 
' 
the case, providing there is substantial evidence 
to justify the instruction. This is true notwith-
standing a material conflict with the states 
-16-
pruof and notwithstanding whether or not the 
jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to 
rhe defenses raised. State vs. Castillo, 23 
Ut. 2d 70, 457 P. 2d. 618 (1969). 
Along with the reasonable and necessary 
holdings that the defendant is entitled to in -
structions on his theory of the case and that 
the instructions must be used for the enlighten -
mcnt and guidance of the jury, and not as a. limit -
ation or comment upon defendants evidence, 
courts have held that juries are properly in-
structed that they have no right to arbitrarily 
disregard the opinions of experts, but are not 
obligated to follow them if these opinions are 
unreasonable or not worthy of their credance. 
Martin vs. Los Angeles Turf Club, 39 C.A. 
' 338, 103 P. 2d 188 (1940); Haight vs. Vallet, 
89 C.,al. 245, 26 P. 897 (1891); Rosander vs. 





The neighboring state of Arizona has 
in the case of State vs. Eisenstein, approved 
311 instruction dealing with the opinions of 
witnesses which stated: 
"The rules of evidence ordinarily 
do not permit the opinions of wit-
nesses to be received as evidence. 
An exception to this rule exists 
in the case of expert witnesses, 
and also in the case of non-expert 
witnesses relative to the question 
of sanity or insanity. A person 
who by education, study and experi-· 
ence has become an expert in any 
art, science or profession, and 
who is called as a witness, may 
give his opinion as to any such 
matter in which he is versed and 
which is material to the case. Like-
wise, non -expert witnesses may 
give their opinions on questions of 
sanity or insanity. You should con -
sider such opinions and should weigh 
the reasons, if any, given therefor. 
You are not bound, however, by any 
such opinibns. You may give them 
the weight to which you deem them 
entitled, whether that be great or 
slight, and you may reject them, 
if in your judgment the reasons given 
therefor are unsound. 0 (72 Ariz. 
320, 235 P. 2d 1011 at 1018). 
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Compare, however, Security Ben. 
Ass'n. vs. Small, 34 Ariz. 458, 272 P. 647 
( 1928) wherein the Arizona Supreme Court held 
the trial court should not disparage the testi -
mony of experts or instruct them in the manner 
of determining the weight of the expert testi-
mony. To do so, the court said, would be 
violate the Arizona Constitutional Provision 
which provides that Judges shall not charge. 
juries with respect to matters of fact nor com -
ment thereon, but simply declare the law. 
As recently as 1969, this Court in 
State vs. Rosenbaum, 22 Ut. 2d, 159, 449 P. 2d 
999, found prejudicial error had been committed 
when a trial court, in instructing on how they 
must consider the defendants alibi evidence, 
indicated that caution should be used. Justice 
Ellett speaking for a unanimous court, stated 
that it was prejudicial error for the court to 
-1.9-
.. 
indicate to the jury that they should. apply a 
d iffercnt standard for determining the weight 
of evidence regarding alibi from that which 
they were to apply to any other evidence in 
the case. Likewise, appellant urges that it is 
prejudicial error for the court to take from the 
consideration of the jury the opinion stated by 
the defense witnesses and by the prosecuting 
witness. Fundamental fairness requires that 
the defendant be entitled to present evidence, 
opinion or otherwise, if admissible, to repud -
iate or explain the charges brought against 
him by the state; and this evidence should stand 
on the same footing as the other evidence in the 
case. Appellant suggests that, at the most, 
the trial court should have instructed the jury 
to regard the opinion evidence, but to regard 
the backgrounds of the witnesses and the basis 
of their opinions in giving weight to such testi-
mony, 
-20-
It might be argued that trial counsel 
for the appellant should have submitted such 
an instruction, however, this court has held 
that in matters which effect fundamental rights 
of the defendant the appellate court will take 
cognizance of the error notwithstanding the 
absence of a preferred, proper instruction. 
State vs. Cobo, 90 Ut. 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936); 
State vs. Smith, '90 Ut. 482, 62 P. 2d 1110 (1936). 
CONCLUSION 
A fair reading of the record indicates 
an intention on the part of the trial judge to 
limit the effect of opinion statements made by 
·the complaining witness in a letter written to 
the appellant, admitted into evidence by the 
appellant after great difficulty. This intention 
was manifest in jury Instruction No. S which 
in its sweeping language takes from the consid -
cration of the jury not only that rather unim -




but literally strikes from their con$ideration 
the testimony, on behalf of the appellant, of 
Trooper Knight, an expert in alcohol studies; 
and Roscoe Grover, an expert gunsmith. Such 
an instruction when read with Instruction No. 
7, is confusing; such an instruction when con-
sidered against the defense presented by the 
appellant constitutes a great limitation on the 
evidence presented; and such an instruction 
when considered in light of Utah law is a com -
ment, and probably the ultimate judicial com -
ment, upon evidence presented by appellant. 
This, we urge, is prejudicial, reversible error. 
The judgment should be reversed and the appel -
lant granted a new trial. . 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gerald G. Gundry 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
692 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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